Sainthood and Psychoanalysis: Tirso\u27s \u3cem\u3eSanta Juana\u3c/em\u3e by Stroud, Matthew D
Trinity University 
Digital Commons @ Trinity 
Modern Languages and Literatures Faculty 
Research Modern Languages and Literatures Department 
1996 
Sainthood and Psychoanalysis: Tirso's Santa Juana 
Matthew D. Stroud 
Trinity University, mstroud@trinity.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.trinity.edu/mll_faculty 
 Part of the Modern Languages Commons 
Repository Citation 
Stroud, M.D. (1996). Sainthood and psychoanalysis: Tirso's Santa Juana. In H.W. Sullivan & R.A. Galoppe 
(Ed.), Tirso de Molina: His originality then and now (pp. 144-161). Ottawa: Dovehouse Editions Canada. 
This Contribution to Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Modern Languages and Literatures 
Department at Digital Commons @ Trinity. It has been accepted for inclusion in Modern Languages and Literatures 
Faculty Research by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Trinity. For more information, please contact 
jcostanz@trinity.edu. 
MATIHEW D. STROUD 
Sainthood and Psychoanalysis: Tirso's 
Santa Juana 
In his seminar of February 20, 1973, entitled "God and the Jouissance of Woman," Lacan provocatively implies a connection between feminine sexuality and sainthood, 
using as examples two Spanish mystics, San Juan de la Cruz 
and Santa Teresa de Avila. He does not here discuss 
sainthood per se, but rather mysticism, with its emphasis 
on unity of the soul with God, noting that mystics are most 
often women or "highly gifted people like Saint John of the 
Cross," that is, men who have enrolled themselves on the 
feminine side of sexuality, in the "not-all" (Lacan 1982, 
146-47). In the next seminar, "A Love Letter," Lacan notes 
the specific connection between the love of the soul and 
hysteria. Considering the fact that Golden Age literature 
prefigures so remarkably many of the basic contentions of 
Lacanian thought, it is not surprising that Tirso de Molina's 
trilogy of the life of Sor Juana de la Cruz, Santa Juana, 
should provide a useful example for the study of these 
connections among hysteria, sexuality, and religious 
experience as literary manifestations. 
At the outset, however, two preliminary principles need 
to be stated about the connections between psychoanalysis 
and either literature or religion. First, it is not the purpose 
here, nor should it be the purpose anywhere, to "psycho­
analyze" a literary character. Such an endeavor is, quite 
simply, impossible; the basis of psychoanalysis is the 
talking subject, and while characters do "speak," they do 
not speak as real people do. They make no unforeseen slips 
of the tongue in the way living subjects do; their unintended 
utterances are consciously written into the text by the au-
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thor. They certainly will not answer our questions, nor can 
we delve into their family histories to discover the truths 
of their desires. That does not mean, however, that psy­
choanalytic literary criticism is fraudulent. Both disci­
plines ultimately study the human condition. Literary 
characters and the situations they get into are representa­
tions of psychoanalytic truths, that is, the workings of de­
sire, its effects, and attempts to mediate it both within the 
subject and in its relations to others. 
Second, and more harsh, is the requirement of a kind of 
scientific detachment or skepticism when dealing with 
matters of religion. If one really supposes that Juana spoke 
directly to Christ, appeared and disappeared at will, and 
was able to fly, then these comments here will be irrelevant 
at best and blasphemous at worst. These manifestations 
should be considered metaphorical representations of men­
tal disturbances familiar in psychoanalytic case studies: 
hearing voices, having visions, believing one has supernat­
ural powers, and the like, and in that sense they are a use­
ful object of study. At the same time, in no way should one 
dismiss religion, especially in its usefulness to and effects on 
the subject. God can be defined in many ways which are 
most pertinent to Lacanian psychoanalysis: the unnamable, 
the Other, the real, the Name-of-the-Father, the all, the 
not-all. Lacan himself specifically included discussions of 
religious experience as pertinent to the psychoanalytic 
clinic, but, of course, only in their relationship to the speak­
ing subject (Lacan 1976, 103). 
Tirso's Santa Juana is, in one sense, a typical hagio­
graphical play that depicts the miraculous events associ­
ated with the life of a saint. At least one facet of Tirso' s ge­
nius is revealed by the way in which he placed the amaz­
ing actions of the life of the saint in the context of such fa­
miliar comedia plot elements as the efforts of a father to 
marry his daughter honorably, the rivalry among several 
suitors for various young women, and crises caused by honor 
and love. In Lacanian terms, these plot elements reflect the 
workings of the imaginary and symbolic registers. The 
imaginary register is the result of the "mirror stage" in 
which the subject learns that at its center is a lack, att in-
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ability ever to absorb or unite with the others that are the 
objects of desire.1 As such, the imaginary is the locus of the 
ego in its relationship to the other and is marked by an im­
age of the self as whole and unified, leading to manifesta­
tions of defensiveness, rivalry, and self-protection on the 
one hand, and, paradoxically, since the totalized subject is 
in fact only imaginary, love on the other. One of the central 
imaginary fantasies is that one can fill in the gap at the 
core of one's being as subject by relating to another person. 
The mechanisms by which one person is attracted to an­
other are called lures. 
The symbolic is the result of the infant's passage 
through the Oedipus phase and the concomitant acquisition 
of language. For Lacan, there are no more important events 
in the establishment of the human subject than the 
imposition of the Name-of-the-Father, a metaphor not 
only for the subject's entry into language but also for the 
law, culture, and civilization.2 Language resides in the 
Other, the symbolic Other, the capital Other that is at 
once both the cause of the subject's desire and its 
unattainable object. This symbolic register serves primarily 
to mediate desire through the promise of law and order: if 
one follows the rules, one will be given a life in language 
that will compensate, or at least cover up, the essential and 
unfillable lack that structures all speaking subjects.3 The 
symbolic in no way replaces the imaginary; both are 
1 La can' s discussion of the mirror stage is one of his earliest con­
tributions, and it appears as the first selection in Ecrits: A Selec­
tion (1977, 1-7). It is taken up again and again throughout the 
seminars, especially in its relation to imaginary. La can' s writ­
ings about the imaginary, as with his writings about almost ev­
erything, were never published in one place or laid out in a sys­
tematic fashion. For general introductory discussions of the 
imaginary, see Lee 1990, 17-30 and Ragland-Sullivan 1986, 130-
59. 
2 For more on the Name-of-the-Father, see Lee 1990,64-67. Reg­
nault deals with the Name-of-the-Father in a religious context 
(1985, 61-62; 91; 95; 100). 
3 As with the imaginary, there is no one treatise on the symbolic. 
See Ragland-Sullivan 1986, 130-37, 145-83. 
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always in play as people respond to a lure and fall in love, 
or swear revenge against an adversary, only to have these 
desires mediated in the symbolic by marriage in the case of 
love, or justice in a court of law in the case of revenge. Two 
important considerations regarding the workings of the 
symbolic are, first, the fact that when one makes choices, as 
in the decision to submit to the law, one loses something, 
the subject fades.4 Second, the symbolic promise, just as the 
imaginary fantasy, is doomed to failure in its attempt to 
cover over the lack at the center of the subject. 
At the beginning of the trilogy, Juana is closely bound to 
these imaginary and symbolic plot elements. Juana's father, 
Juan, wants his daughter to marry a nobleman, Francisco 
Loarte, for whom she is the object of desire. Once he sees 
her, he falls hopelessly in love with her. For Loarte, love 
is an impossible imperative. Love is desire (PII: III, viii, 
860a), which is at once pleasurable (PI: II, xi, 798b) and, be­
cause it recalls the absence that creates the desire, also 
untenable, or, in the terminology of the plays, poison (PI: I, 
iii, 778a), blindness (PI: II, vi, 793b ), and death (PI: I, ix, 
782a; PI: II, xv, 801b). When Toribio says that love can 
attain the impossible (PI: 1., i, 774a), he is clearly speaking 
from the point of view of the imaginary, of which the two 
Don Juan figures, Jorge in Part II and Luis in Part III, are 
sterling examples. Jorge will never be satisfied with one 
woman (PII: I, iv, 829b); indeed, no single other person can 
ever completely satisfy a subject because there is no such 
thing as a complete subject. What makes these two 
particularly interesting as representatives of the 
4 Aphanisis, or the fading of the subject, is always a characteris­
tic of the speaking subject; as soon as the subject "appears 
somewhere as meaning, he is manifested elsewhere as 'fading,' as 
disappearance" (Lacan 1978, 218; 221; Durand 1983, 863-64). 
The fading of the subject is related both to castration and (again) 
the basis of the symbolic in language. "All that is language is 
lent from this otherness and this is why the subject is always a 
fading thing that runs under the chain of signifiers. For the 
definition of a signifier is that it represents a subject not for 
another subject but for another signifier" (Lacan 1972, 194; Lee 
1990, 146-54. 
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imaginary is that neither Jorge nor Luis has any interest in 
mediating his desires. Jorge says that one tries in vain to 
rein in his will (PII: I, iv, 829a-b), and that the expectation 
and desire are better than the possession, referring to the 
imaginary lure and promise of fulfillment, which no 
possession ever really brings (PH: II, xii, 852b). Luis tells 
his father that he has no wish to mend his ways (PIII: I, ii, 
868a). At the same time that they make no commitment to 
the women they seduce, they still are extremely jealous 
should the women see other men (PII: III, viii, 860b; PI: I, i, 
867b ). Even more, the scene in which Ines, thinking that 
Luis is Cesar, allows him to enter her house and have sex 
with her (PHI: II, xiii, 893a), is a typical scene of 
.meconnaissance, of misrecognition so common to the 
imaginary in its misunderstanding of where desire comes 
from (Lacan 1988, 116, 167-68). And he does it, in good Don 
Juan fashion, with the promise of marriage, the promise, 
doomed to failure, of some kind of restoration of wholeness 
through the symbolic. 
Loarte does what honorable people usually do in the co­
media, he asks her father for her hand in marriage. It is 
when the fathers of these characters try to impose their 
wills on the desires of their children that one begins to no­
tice some important differences between the plots of these 
plays and those of comedias de enredo. Juana's father, Juan, 
is unable to get her to submit, despite his pleadings and ar­
guments and those of his brother (PI: II, i, 788a-89b ). Like­
wise, Diego, Luis's father, and Mateo, Melchor's father, 
also fail to impose the law on their rebellious sons. Submis­
sion to the Name-of-the-Father is absolutely essential for 
a functioning subject, and, toward the end of the trilogy, 
there is a strong, explicit moral to the effect that a father 
must punish a disobedient son (Pill: lll, xiii, 903b ), that it is 
dangerous for fathers to love their sons so much that they 
fail to impress the law upon them (PIII: ill, xiv, 904a). 
That the fathers of these characters are not successful in 
dealing with their children's desires does not mean, how­
ever, that they somehow inhabit a world without symbolic 
mediation. Juana is by no means immune from the effects of 
the law. She is known for her obedience; her greatest joy 
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appears to lie in obeying the law. Yet, she is unimpressed 
with Juan's plans for her life. She is religious, and, as such, 
follows the law of God, not the law of her father, who ad­
mits, "Es su inclinaci6n divina" (PI: I, xii, 784a). By focusing 
on the shift from one father to another, Tirso is able to con­
trast the workings of the secular comedias with those of the 
comedia de santos in the same play with a simple shift 
from the biological or other secular, symbolic father to God. 
When Juana states that her father cannot marry her to a 
man when God wants her for His own spouse (PI: II, i, 789b), 
we have a substitution of fathers: God's law is higher than 
Juan's and she will follow that instead. This submission is 
not, actually, quite so different from obedience to one's 
biological father; one must still suppress one's own desires, 
give up something of one's individuality, in exchange for 
the symbolic promise. The nuns in the convent are very much 
subject to the symbolic hierarchy of the Church, as we see in 
the first Abbess's preoccupation with her relationship with 
the Provincial Father (PI: III, vii, 812b-13a). They are not, 
however, exempt from the imaginary register. Perhaps the 
most striking example of imaginary rivalry within the con­
text of the religious plot is the envy of Juana's success by the 
vicaria (later to become an abbess), who even enters into an 
agreement with Jorge to discredit Juana by accusing her of 
witchcraft. s 
Who is the God to whom Juana is married? On the one 
5 See PI: III, vii-viii, 813a-b; PI: Ill, xiii-xiv, 817a-b; PI: III, xviii, 
821a; PII: II, ii, 844b, as well as the demonic possession of the lit­
tle girl, PI: III, ix-x, 814a-16a. The question of the difference be­
tween divinely inspired miracles and witchcraft is both puz­
zling and interesting, especially in a literary context. How can 
one know the difference? One possible explanation in psycho­
analytic terms is that witchcraft is the sign of the obsessive neu­
rotic (the attempt to gain more power), while sainthood is hys­
teric (the attempt to lose power and rejoice in the symptom). An­
other possibility is that sainthood is hysteric and possession is 
psychotic: in possession there is an enigma in the symbolic that 
the possessed cannot process, as is evidenced in the symptom of 
speaking in languages the person does not know. This problem 
dearly deserves more study. 
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hand, there is God the creator, God the lawgiver, God the 
severe, but forgiving judge mentioned so often as an incentive 
to characters to change their ways (PII: I, i, 827b; PII: II, x, 
851b; PII: III, x, 861b; Pill: I, xv, 879a). Even Jorge and Luis 
submit to the law of this father (Pill: III, xxi, 907b-8a). 
This Christian God-as-Father should not, however, be mis­
taken for the philosopher's God. Fran�ois Regnault, in Dieu 
est inconscient (1985, 32-47), meditates on the difference be­
tween God as perfection and God as Lord, a difference noted 
by Newton in his Principia. God as all is perfect and infi­
nite; He is the God of philosophy, of science; He governs 
the universe. The subject can have no relationship with 
such a God because there is no point of intersubjective con­
tact; He is not a speaking subject. The other God, the God of 
the Israelites, the Catholic God, "my God," can indeed 
maintain a more symmetrical relationship with the subject 
precisely because He too is constituted by a lack; He is a 
speaking subject (Regnault 1985, 36-43). This God, the God I 
worship, is the one who takes a personal interest in the 
day-to-day activities of his creatures. And He does this 
because he is not-all. 
Lacan' s matheme for the not-all appears as the heading 
of "A Love Letter" (Lacan 1982, 149). Like almost all of his 
mathemes, it is rather opaque, and it underlines paradoxes 
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The left side of the paradigm can be read: For all subjects or 
x, the function (<I> rules x. At the same time, there exists an x 
that is not subject to or that negates the function <!>. This is 
the formula for all, but it has the second part because there 
is no such thing as truly all. The subject is dependent upon 
the Other (0), the Other itself is not all (0), and there is 
no Other of the Other (Lacan 1982, 33). Perhaps a different 
way of saying the same thing is that all is all, including its 
failings. The right hand side can be read such that there is 
no x that is engaged in the function <I>; (yet, at the same 
time, there exists no x that totally escapes or negates the 
function <I>. Again, in other words, just as there is no all 
without its possibility for failure, there is nothing that 
does not allow for the possibility of the function <1>. These 
two sides are logically identical except for the inverted 
order of the assertions, or, to put it metaphorically, 
sexuality, divided symbolically between the masculine and 
feminine, functions the same way for all individuals. 
Neither all nor nothing is absolute. 
With respect to God, the paradox can be stated as fol­
lows: even though God is the omnipotent Creator, God can 
also be the Other as not-all, the God who himself is lack­
ing, a fact that allows God the possibility of jouissance. If 
God were all, a mystical relationship (or any other kind, 
for that matter), would be quite impossible. Instead, we 
have a God who, if He were a person, would enter into in­
tersubjective relationships with other divided subjects in 
both the imaginary and the symbolic. That God is not-all in 
Santa Juana is clear by the discussion of Protestant 
rebellion and colonial prosyletizing. Juana promises to help 
Emperor Charles V in his wars and conquests, obviously 
showing that this God is not the God of everybody but the 
God of only a few (PI: III, xx, 822b ). Only Catholics practice 
the real faith (PII: I, i, 825a-28a).6 A second manifestation 
6 It is quite interesting that, in discussing the difference between 
Catholicism and Protestantism, she exclaims,"0Viva la ley de 
Cristo soberana!" (PII: I, i, 827a), when the main difference be­
tween Protestants and the Catholics was over Church hierarchy 
and secular functioning, which Juana herself avoids by her di-
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of God's lack is the presence of the devil, evoked in the 
play as an alternative source of Juana's supernatural 
powers. If God really were infinite, there would be no place 
for the devil. Perhaps more important is the division of 
God into three personages in the play: God, who never 
appears on stage, but who is referred to both as the creator 
of the world but not part of the world, as we have seen (PI: 
m, xx, 822a-b; see Regnault 1985, 46); Jesus, who died on the 
cross for sins that were not His own; and the Christ child, 
who maintains a definite, explicit relationship with his 
mother, the Virgin Mary. Religion has taught us to invoke 
the name of God the judge, the very locus of the Name-of­
the-Father, the origin of castration, the dead father, the 
absent father (Regnault 1985, 46-47, 61�2). But it is God as 
the suffering, pathetic Jesus Christ and God as child who 
are considered by Juana to be her husband. They are not-all, 
found at the place of the Other; they are the ones who 
establish a relationship with Juana (Regnault 1985, 46-47, 
62). Indeed, the very fact of the division of God into parts is 
an indication of His incompletion. Regnault goes into great 
elaboration of the trinity from unity (the Filioque 
argument, 1985, 68-91). But, of course, the fact that God has 
three manifestations in the play shows that the God of all 
is in fact not-all, even if He pretends to be. 
The paradigm of the not-all, clearly applicable to God, 
was introduced by Lacan in his treatment of feminine sexu­
ality in which he elaborates his idea that women, as a cat­
egory not necessarily defined by biological sex, are not 
entirely inscribed within the law (the function <I> in the 
paradigm, the phallic function). While man's jouissance is 
focused on the imaginary fantasy of possessing woman, 
woman "has many ways of taking on the phallus and keep­
ing it for herself because of supplementary jouissance -it is 
in some ways liberating" (Lacan 1982, 145). That woman is 
not-all does not imply that she is inferior to man; "not-all" 
here does not mean "deficient." Rather, woman is not-all in 
the sense that she is not susceptible to the imaginary total­
ization under the phallic signifier (the law) as is man. Be-
rect communion with God. 
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cause she really partakes of both sides of the paradigm 
(since, as a speaking being who is not psychotic, she is also 
subject to the phallic signifier), her sexuality is much less 
rigid, more fluid. Characteristic of the not-all quality of 
feminine sexuality is its nature as masquerade. To give a 
common theatrical example, in the middle of Part I, Act II, 
Juana appears dressed as a man, which visually captions 
the fluidity of sexuality, especially feminine sexuality un­
der the sign of masquerade, as well as foreshadowing the 
hysteric's question, "Am I a man or a woman?"7 Even more, 
when Loarte goes to embrace her, she disappears com­
pletely from his sight (PI: I, xiii, 800a). A further textual 
example of the not-all of feminine sexuality is Gil's asser­
tion, made to explain the fact that demons have possessed 
his daughter: "lNo tien hartos agujeros I una mujer?" (PI: 
Ill, v, 811a). 
Woman's jouissance is much more directly connected to 
the jouissance of the Other; in religious terms, it is an inter­
subjective relation between souls, which led Lacan to refer 
to women as amoureuses6elles ament l'ame, they ,soul" for 
the soul (Lacan 1982, 156). Another word for this Other is, 
of course, God, an ex-static god who experiences pleasure 
and pain, a god who ,comes" (Lacan 1982, 146). Most hyster­
ics are women, and Lacan provides here the link between 
hysteria and feminine sexuality. Because of the more direct 
link between the subject and the Other (whose very exis­
tence is the marker of the lack in the subject), the hysteric 
subverts or bypasses the usual imaginary and symbolic con­
structs that one creates to hide the lack; rather, she rejoices 
in the suffering that experiencing the lack engenders. The 
not-all becomes the source of the pleasurable pain, the 
symptom that she loves more than her "self" (Ragland­
Sullivan 1989, 213; Millot 1985, 227). 
All of this brings us back to Lac an's assertion with 
7 Of course, sexuality is a symbolic construct, not a biological 
destiny, and one may enroll oneself in either category as man or 
woman. As Crespo points out (PI: I, i, 775a), "Amor es her­
mafrodita," referring to the illusory nature of the sexual differ­
ences. 
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which we began, that there is a connection between reli­
gion, in particular mysticism, and feminine sexuality. Reg­
nault, again in Dieu est inconscient, states unequivocally 
that religion is closely bound to hysteria. 8 In the Christian 
ceremony, the flock faithful are compelled to identify with 
the suffering, imaginary father through a metaphorical 
substitution of Jesus Christ for their own fathers. They al­
low themselves, at least for the duration of the ceremony, 
to become hystericized, to enjoy the symptoms of pain and 
self-denial. 9 For Ragland-Sullivan, the symptom is not 
only the bodily manifestation of desire as lack in the real, 
something linked to real jouissance, to alienation and 
death, but also something that the subject can believe in 
(1989, 213, 216, 222-23). The suffering and symptoms, and 
even death, for a Christian are not bad. They are not to be 
considered burdens but a sign of glory, just as Christ says 
that His crown of thorns is his crown of glory (PII: I, x, 
834a). In the context of the play, not only is Juana hysteric, 
but all those whom Juana helps, Mari Pascual (PII: II, iii, 
845b-46b; PII: II, x, 851a; PII: II, xiii-xiv, 853a-54b), Ana 
Manrique (PHI: II, iv, 887a-b), Jorge (Pill: II, v-vi, 887b-
88a), Luis (Pill: III, xvii-xviii, 905b-7a), and the rest, are in 
effect hystericized in salvation. They all learn to love suf­
fering and desire death. Indeed, by the very concept of orig­
inal sin, all are always already guilty and must suffer 
unimaginably. 
The love that one experiences in hysteria is not that 
which is easily mediated by the symbolic. Indeed, it goes 
far beyond the love object, as the other, to the great Other, 
8 There is also an obsessional neurotic component; everything 
that holds for obsessional neurosis also holds for religion. See 
Regnault 1985, 49, 53. 
9 Compare Ragland-Sullivan's description of the hysteric as "one 
who preserves the power of the dead father (the fantasy of an 
ideal father) over and above the conscious admission that a den­
igrated imaginary father may have been impotent, minimal, mean, 
or simply ineffectual" (1989, 226; 231). In the Christian 
scenario, with its multiple manifestations of God, the hysteric 
can at the same time identify with the suffering, denigrated father 
(Christ) and preserve the power of the ideal father (God). 
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the source of desire. In hysteria one suffers precisely to as­
sure the predominance of the Other, to become the Other's 
object of desire, to become effectively a slave for an insa­
tiable, powerful Other (Ragland-Sullivan 1989, 214-15), 
descriptions that are clearly related to the Christian doc­
trines regarding humility (Di Ciaccia 1989). Hysteria im­
plies a plus-de-jouir, which is at once an excess and a cessa­
tion of pleasure. The hysteric experiences jouissance 
through suffering. Of course, all jouissance is partly suffer­
ing, but the hysteric seeks out the painful aspects of it 
rather than hiding them under both imaginary and sym­
bolic structures. Just like the mystic, she effaces herself and 
fades before the Other, which, not-all itself, provides the 
desired suffering (Ragland-Sullivan 1989, 234). But it is not 
only the Other as the locus of the symbolic to which the 
hysteric appeals; it is the Other as not-all, to the real lack 
that inhabits it. Just as we have conceptions of God as all 
and perfect, or as not-all and capable of an intersubjective 
relationship, so too do we have an ambivalence in God be­
cause He is at once the incarnation of the symbolic and not­
all in its promise of totalizing harmony.10 Indeed, this God 
represents the failure of the symbolic, the fact that there is 
a real gap hollowed out at the core of the Other. Juana 
points to this failure when she equates marriage with the 
cross and death (PI: II, i, 789a-b ). For her, the value of the 
symbolic (marriage) lies not in its capacity to solve all 
problems but precisely in the suffering caused by its inabil­
ity to compensate completely. As a hysteric, she accepts the 
burden, but not to mediate desire. Instead, she rejoices in the 
suffering of Jesus Christ (PI: II, xvi, 801b), the incarnation of 
God who kept his symbolic promise, but only with His own 
death. The symbolic Other at once constitutes the law and 
the mediation of desire, but, because it is not-all, also gives 
rise to the possibility of suffering, of the hysteric's 
10 Regnault (1985, 97, 101) notes that, while one face of the Other, 
of God, is supported by feminine jouissance, the other face would 
be that of phallic jouissance. On the one side there is Mary­
Diana: the sexual drive; on the other there is Yahweh-Adonai: 
the death drive. 
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symptom. Taken to its extreme, suffering leads to death. 
The Christian subject, and especially the saint, must die in 
order to experience total jouissance in the union with God. 
There is no doubt that Juana identifies with Jesus and his 
suffering, and that she even takes on punishment for sins of 
which she is not guilty herself (as her Guardian angel tells 
her), just as Christ did.11 But the suffering is itself the 
source of her jouissance. For Juana, her development into a 
saint follows a trajectory from the secular to the religious to 
the mystic. In the very first scene of Part I, Juana appears as 
godmother at a wedding (PI: I, i, 771b ). As such, she is the 
representative of the symbolic, of the Other, in this cele­
bration of the mediation of desire. By act II, she is taking 
up the religious life of a nun, effectively replacing her fa­
ther Juan by God, the symbolic father: uPadre: aDios por 
padre tengo; I tfo: Dios solo es mi Ho; I Dios es mi esposo y 
mi duefto" (PI: II, xviii, 803b; PI: II, vii, 794a). By the time 
she has fully developed as a saint, she has renounced her 
biological family, and given up on her own family novel 
through her identification with the pain of Jesus Christ. 
She is beyond them now and her jouissance is not susceptible 
to their pleas. 
Starting with her initial supernatural experience, in 
which the habit of a Franciscan nun descends to her from 
heaven, Juana's discourse is concerned almost exclusively 
with pain and pleasure. Juana accepts all of her tribula­
tions with unsuppressed delight. Indeed, if such a thing is 
possible, Juana becomes famous for her humility (PI: III, i, 
807a; PI: III, ii, 809a). When ordered to maintain silence for 
11 Her Guardian Angel tells her that she has never committed a 
mortal sin, and that she is a "monja vieja en la inocencia" (PII: I, 
ix, 833b). There are numerous examples of her profession of 
worthlessness and willingness to assume guilt: PI: III, vi, 812a; 
PI: III, vi, 812b; PI: III, xvii, 820a; PII: I, i, 826a; PH: II, iii, 846b; 
PH: II, iv, 847a; PII: II, v, 848b-49b; PII: II, vii, 850a; PII: III, i, 
85Sa; PH: III, ii, 857b; PIII: I, xiv, 877b. There is, on some level, 
quite a bit of ego about being humiliated. She is well-known for, 
and proud of, the humiliation that she is willing to suffer. This, 
perhaps, is the religious imaginary, the ego of the humiliated, the 
pride of the masochist. 
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one year, she remains silent for two (PI: II, xxiv, 806b);12 she 
actively seeks out flagellation (PI: III, iii, 809b) and incar­
ceration (PII: II, v, 849a), all in the name of cleansing her of 
her nonexistent sins. Ironically, the vicaria's envy of her, 
based as it is in her own imaginary rivalries, feeds Juana's 
hysteric desire for suffering. Juana lauds her prudent dis­
pensation of punishment, underscoring again the difference 
between the character of the ordinary religious woman and 
that of the mystic saint. The vicaria, who becomes abbess, 
says about her uvictories" over Juana, uya se cumpli6 mi de­
seo" (PII: IT, vii, 850a), but, of course, it is only an imaginary 
triumph, in both the Lacanian and conventional senses of 
the word. At the same time, she is also fulfilling Juana's 
hysterical demands for suffering. When Juana asks how she 
can resist such pleasure (PI: II, iii, 791b; PI: II, xvii, 802b; 
PII: III, i, 855a), she is expressing a masochism that wants 
to remain unsatisfied (Ragland-Sullivan 1989, 219; 225). 
Her pleasure here is jouissance, which, it should be 
remembered, is impossible pleasure. When it has crossed 
into the realm of the plus-de-jouir, the excess of jouissance, 
it is the pleasure one feels when one comes into direct con­
tact with the real, the lack. Just as her actual conversations 
with Christ, the Virgin Mary, and the saints are impossi­
ble, so too is the joy associated with them. Then again, that 
is what makes the experience so intensely mystical. This is 
more than just sexual pleasure; this is beyond all that, sur­
passing symbolic and imaginary pleasure. 
That these ordeals are done to imitate Christ could not 
be more manifest, as we see in the words of Christ Himself: 
CRISTO: Juana: Varon de dolores 
me llamo yo en la Escritura; 
quien imitarme procura 
busque espinas, deje flores. 
12 There seems to be a clear relationship between silence and 
sainthood, as in the assertion within the play that sometimes the 
silent tongue deserves the name of saint, (PII: III, i, 856b ). On loss 
of voice and excessive talking as hysteric symptoms, see 
Ragland-Sullivan (1989, 209; 236). 
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El que goza mis favores 
pasar por trabajos trata, 
y aunque el mundo mas le abata, 
con los trabajos se esfuerza, 
que el Cielo padece fuerza 
y el violento le arrebata. (PII: I, x, 834a) 
Somewhat later, Juana makes it clear that her desire is to 
suffer what Christ suffered: "Es justo I que a Dios pague en 
la moneda I que pag6 por mis pecados" (PII: II, v, 849a). At 
the end of Part II, a nun comments on Juana's virtual trans­
formation into Christ: "En manos, pies y costado I impresas 
tiene las llagas I de su soberano Esposo, I en quien est· trans­
formada" (PII: III, xxi, 865b ). Perhaps the final attribute of 
Christ that Juana imitates is the ability to take away sins, 
as she does when Jorge asks her to save him from hell (PII: 
III, xii, 862b ), or bring the dead back to life, as she does 
with the young girl (PHI: III, xiv, 903b-4a). 
In Part III, Act I, Juana says that she wants to feel the 
pain of Christ's passion (Pill: I, vii, 873b), a particularly 
apt word in this case because it means both pleasure and 
suffering, not a bad shorthand definition of the effects of 
jouissance. As the trilogy comes to an end and Juana ap­
proaches her death, she converses with the Christ child in 
the language of love: ''Tu amor ha sido, I mi Dios, larga di­
laci6n I de este destierro pesado ... " (Pili: II, xv, 894b). This 
is love, but not the same kind we saw between other pairs of 
characters, this is the love between souls, amour, or 
perhaps in Spanish, almor. Early on, Toribio, noting the 
different kinds of love, pointed out that God is love and 
aspires to infinity (PI: I, i, 774b); that is, He is a manifest in 
the love of the soul for the Other. Just to underscore the 
nature of this type of love, Juana addresses her soul: 
JUANA: Albricias, alma mfa, 
que ya de vuestro bien se acerca el dfa, 
y el destierro cumplido 
que ausente de la patria os ha tenido, 
el soberano Esposo 
llamandoos a su talamo amoroso .... 
(Pill: III, vi, 899b) 
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While one can compare the rhetoric here to that found in 
imaginary love, one cannot fail to connect the traditional 
use of "talamo" with "tUm.ulo," making even clearer the 
connection with the death drive. The goal of Juana's 
jouissance must be death, because only through death can 
she "unite" with her "husband," Christ. When, after a 
soliloquy full of talk of obedience, suffering, and death 
(Pili: II, xiv, 894a), the Christ child calls her to her 
apotheosis, he says that He raises up those who debase 
themselves (Pili: II, xv, 894b). As she approaches death, 
her identification with Christ becomes practically 
absolute, even down to her name, "Juana de la Cruz" (Pili: 
III, vii, 900a). Her Guardian Angel presents her with a 
chest in which he has kept the marks of her suffering, the 
nails, the hairshirt, and so on, which he also calls her 
"joyas divinas" (Pill: III, vi, 900a). For Juana, as she tells 
the nuns, these instruments of humiliation and suffering are 
"el tesoro I que apetece mi deseo" (Pili: III, ix, 901a). In the 
end, Juana's sainthood is indeed mystical, even if it does not 
have all the hallmarks of the experiences of San Juan de Ia 
Cruz and Santa Teresa. Juana's goal is the unification of her 
soul with Christ and she achieves that goal through ec­
static ex-sistence, 13 a being absent in herself. Unlike the 
hysteric who seeks a psychoanalytic cure, Juana is consumed 
by her symptoms, she enters her fantasy and partakes of 
the highest form of religious experience. 
In this discussion of psychoanalysis and seventeenth­
century theater, it is not really so important that Juana's 
character can be demonstrated to have the structure of hys­
teria or even that these plays provide successful illustra­
tions of psychoanalytic concepts. In that case we would be 
13 The concept of ex-sistence is applicable not only to hysteric 
jouissance but also to God Himself. Regnault (1985, 58-60, 63-
64), citing Lacan's Seminar XXII, R.S.I., notes that God is the un­
namable; as such He does not exist. He is a hole, but we name 
Him. "I am that I am"; what comes out of the hole is the name. 
God is ex-sistence; He is repression incarnate. In that much, reli­
gion is true. The distribution of the function of ex-sistence (hole, 
Real, name) makes of this God not-all. 
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using the play to read Lacan rather than vice versa. What 
is of interest is the fact that, at some level, Tirso seemed to 
intuit the same truths about the human condition that La­
can was able to elucidate through his reading of Freud. Tir­
so's plays are marvelous representations of phenomena that 
are of interest to psychoanalysis, and he was able to map 
them in such a way as to bring to bear the differences be­
tween secular and religious experience on the one hand, and 
different types of religious experiences on the other, to 
highlight the nature of Juana's condition. He seems to 
know, more than three hundred years earlier, what Reg­
nault sums up in Dieu est inconscient (1985, 51), that reli­
gious truth is the truth of the subject, the truth of desire, of 
drives, but hidden by mythologies and destiny. 
Trinity University 
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